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CRIMINOLOGY 
THE EFFECTS OF BODY-WORN CAMERAS 
ON POLICE ACTIVITY AND POLICE-
CITIZEN ENCOUNTERS: A RANDOMIZED 
CONTROLLED TRIAL* 
ANTHONY A. BRAGA 
WILLIAM H. SOUSA 
JAMES R. COLDREN, JR. 
DENISE RODRIGUEZ** 
Many have suggested that placing body-worn cameras (BWCs) on 
police officers improves the civility of police-citizen encounters and enhances 
citizen perceptions of police transparency and legitimacy.  In response, many 
police departments have adopted this technology to address public concerns 
over the quality of policing in their communities.  The existing program 
evaluation evidence on the intended and unintended consequences of 
outfitting police officers with BWCs is still developing, however.  This study 
reports the findings of a randomized controlled trial involving more than 400 
police officers in Las Vegas, Nevada.  We find that officers equipped with 
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body-worn cameras generated fewer complaints and use of force reports 
relative to officers without cameras.  BWC officers also made more arrests 
and issued more citations than their non-BWC counterparts.  The findings of 
this randomized controlled trial raise the possibility that planning for the 
placement of BWCs on officers should consider the competing effects of 
improvement in civilian perceptions of police generated by reductions in 
complaints and use of force incidents and of public concerns about increased 
enforcement activity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent deadly police officer-involved shooting events in Baltimore, 
Charlotte, Chicago, Ferguson, and elsewhere in the United States have 
exposed very concerning rifts in the relationships between the police and the 
communities they protect and serve.1  Placing body-worn cameras (BWCs) 
on police officers has been suggested as one potentially powerful response to 
 
1  See, e.g., Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-si 
ege-after-police-shooting.html (describing conflict between the community of Ferguson, 
Missouri and its police force over the controversial death of Michael Brown). 
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the current police legitimacy crisis in many U.S. cities.2  Advocates suggest 
there are many benefits associated with placing BWCs on police officers.3  
BWCs are suggested to increase transparency and citizen views of police 
legitimacy, improve police and citizen behaviors during encounters, enhance 
evidence collected for the resolution of complaints against the police and the 
arrest and prosecution of offenders, and provide improved opportunities for 
police training.4  The Obama Administration proposed that Congress provide 
the U.S. Department of Justice with $75 million to fund the purchase of and 
technical assistance for BWCs.5  In 2013, the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics 
estimated that over one-quarter of the approximately 18,000 U.S. police 
departments had adopted the BWC technology, and the number of police 
departments with BWC programs has undoubtedly increased since then.6 
Like other police technologies, the rapid adoption of BWCs has 
occurred within a low-information environment.  As Professor Cynthia Lum 
cautions, the rapid adoption of police technologies in the absence of rigorous 
empirical evidence about their impact can lead to unanticipated and 
unintended consequences that may harm both police and public interests.7  
Social scientists are only beginning to develop scientific knowledge about 
the effects, expected and unexpected, of the BWC technology.8  For instance, 
the evidence on the effects of BWCs on the civility of police-citizen 
encounters is still somewhat unclear.  Several studies find that BWCs reduce 
complaints against police officers and officer use of force reports,9 while 
 
2  See JAY STANLEY, ACLU, POLICE BODY-MOUNTED CAMERAS: WITH RIGHT POLICIES IN 
PLACE, A WIN FOR ALL 1–2 (2015), available at https://www.aclu.org/other/ 
police-body-mounted-cameras-right-policies-place-win-all. 
3  Id. at 2. 
4  MICHAEL D. WHITE, OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., POLICE OFFICER 
BODY-WORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE 6–7 (2014). 
5  FACT SHEET: STRENGTHENING COMMUNITY POLICING, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 1, 2014), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/01/fact-sheet-strengthening-
community-policing.  
6   U.S. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE  STATISTICS, 2013 200 (2015). 
7  Cynthia Lum, Body Worn Cameras—Rapid Adoption in a Low Information 
Environment?, TRANSLATIONAL CRIMINOLOGY 6, 6–7 (2015). 
8  CYNTHIA LUM ET AL., EXISTING AND ONGOING BODY WORN CAMERA RESEARCH: 
KNOWLEDGE GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES 3 (2015).  
9  See Barak Ariel et al., The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and 
Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 31 J. QUANTITATIVE 
CRIMINOLOGY 509, 524–25 (2015); E.C. Hedberg et al., Body-Worn Cameras and Citizen 
Interactions with Police Officers: Estimating Plausible Effects Given Varying Compliance 
Levels, 34 JUST. Q. 627, 642 (2016); Wesley G. Jennings et al., Evaluating the Impact of Police 
Officer Body-Worn Cameras (BWCs) on Response-to-Resistance and Serious External 
Complaints: Evidence from the Orlando Police Department (OPD) Experience Utilizing a 
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other studies find no statistically significant reductions in complaints against 
BWC officers10 and a concerning increase in assaults on officers with 
BWCs.11 
There is also growing evidence that suggests BWCs may result in 
increased enforcement activity by police officers.  Controlled evaluations 
reveal that BWC officers make more arrests and citations relative to their 
non-BWC counterparts.12  These unexpected outcomes could undermine 
improvements in police-citizen encounters associated with adoption of the 
technology in urban environments.  To some observers, too many police 
departments engage in excessive surveillance and enforcement practices in 
urban neighborhoods.13 
We examine the effects of BWCs on police activity and police-citizen 
encounters in Las Vegas, Nevada.  A randomized controlled trial design 
involving more than 400 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 
(LVMPD) patrol officers tested the impacts of randomly-allocated BWCs on 
complaints, use of force reports, and officer activity outcomes for treatment 
officers relative to control officers.14  Part I reviews the existing literature on 
the impact of BWCs on the civility of police-citizen encounters and police 
officer work activities. Parts II and III describe the Las Vegas randomized 
experiment and the statistical models used to analyze the outcome data.  Part 
IV reveals that our experimental analyses found statistically significant 
reductions in complaints and officer use of force reports for treatment officers 
relative to control officers.  However, we also find statistically significant 
 
Randomized Controlled Experiment, 43 J. CRIM. JUST. 480, 485 (2015). 
10  LYNNE GROSSMITH ET AL., POLICE, CAMERA, EVIDENCE: LONDON’S CLUSTER 
RANDOMISED CONTROLLED TRIAL OF BODY WORN VIDEO 15 (2015). 
11  Barak Ariel et al., Wearing Body-Cameras Increases Assaults Against Officers and Do 
Not Reduce Police-Use of Force: Results from a Global Multisite Experiment, 13 EUR. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 744, 750 (2016). 
12  CHARLES KATZ ET AL., EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF OFFICER WORN BODY CAMERAS IN 
THE PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT 31 (2014); CATHERINE OWENS ET AL., THE ESSEX BWV 
TRIAL: THE IMPACT OF BWV ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OUTCOMES OF DOMESTIC ABUSE INCIDENTS 
14–15 (2014); Justin Ready & Jacob Young, The Impact of On-Officer Video Cameras on 
Police-Citizen Contacts: Findings from a Controlled Experiment in Mesa, AZ, 11 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 445, 452 (2015). 
13  CHARLES EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 
139–45 (2014); VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS 
43–73 (2011); Kathryne Young & Joan Petersilia, Keeping Track: Surveillance, Control, and 
the Expansion of the Carceral State, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1322 (2016). 
14  As will be detailed later in this article, participating LVMPD officers were randomly 
allocated to a treatment group that wore the BWCs during the experiment or to a control group 
that did not wear the BWCs during the experiment.  The control officers served as the 
counterfactual condition to evaluate the effects of BWCs on police officer work activities and 
the civility of police-citizen encounters. 
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increases in arrests and citations made by treatment officers relative to 
control officers.  We discuss implications of these findings for BWC policy 
and practices in the conclusion. 
I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INFLUENCE ON THE CIVILITY OF POLICE-CITIZEN ENCOUNTERS 
Two theoretical perspectives, deterrence and self-awareness, are 
commonly applied to support the position that placing BWCs on officers will 
improve the civility of police-citizen interactions by deterring undesirable 
behaviors (i.e., not wanting to be recorded on video doing something 
inappropriate or illegal) and stimulating desirable behaviors (i.e., 
remembering to treat others with respect).15  Deterrence theory suggests that 
crimes can be prevented when the costs of committing the crime are 
perceived by the offender to outweigh the benefits.16  Much of the literature 
evaluating deterrence focuses on the effect of changing certainty, swiftness, 
and severity of punishment associated with certain acts on the prevalence of 
those crimes.17  The available research suggests that deterrent effects are 
ultimately determined by offender perceptions of sanction risk and 
certainty.18 
BWCs have been suggested as a deterrent to noncompliance with the 
rules of proper behavioral conduct in police-citizen encounters.19  In his 
discussion of the influence of cameras on behavior, Professor Nick Tilley 
argued that deterrence is one prominent prevention mechanism triggered by 
the technology: the presence of a camera “reduces . . . [noncompliance] by 
deterring potential offenders who will not wish to risk apprehension and 
conviction by the evidence captured on videotape or observed by an operator 
on a screen on which their behavior is shown.”20  For officers and citizens 
 
15  Ariel et al., supra note 9, at 516. 
16  FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME 
CONTROL 3 (1973). 
17  See, e.g., PANEL ON RES. ON DETERRENT AND INCAPACITATIVE EFFECTS, DETERRENCE 
AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 96–
97 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978); Philip Cook, Research in Criminal Deterrence: Laying 
the Groundwork for the Second Decade, 2 CRIME & JUST. 211, 230–33 (1980); Raymond 
Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect of the Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment: A 
Review of the Evidence and Issues, 4 JUST. Q. 173, 173–75 (1987). 
18  Daniel Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 201 
(2013). 
19  See Ariel et al., supra note 9, at 526. 
20  NICK TILLEY, UNDERSTANDING CAR PARKS, CRIME, AND CCTV: EVALUATION LESSONS 
FROM SAFER CITIES 3 (1993). 
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alike, the presence of a camera during encounters increases the likelihood 
that any misconduct and illegal behaviors will be captured on video and, as 
such, generates a deterrent effect by increasing their perceptions of the 
likelihood of apprehension and celerity of punishment.21 
Self-awareness theory states that when we focus our attention on 
ourselves, we evaluate and compare our current behavior to our internal 
standards and values.22  This theory further suggests that when human beings 
are under observation, they modify their behavior, exhibit more socially 
acceptable behavior, adhere to social norms, and cooperate more fully with 
the rules.23  People are more likely to align their behavior with personal 
standards when made self-aware and believe that they will be negatively 
affected if they do not live up to these standards.24  Various environmental 
cues and situations induce awareness of the self, such as mirrors, an audience, 
or being videotaped or recorded.25  A well-developed line of research 
suggests that people do alter their behavior once they know that they are 
being observed.26 
The presence of BWCs during police-citizen encounters is suggested to 
stimulate self-awareness by making these individuals conscious that they are 
being watched and their actions are being recorded.27  As a result, police and 
citizens alike become self-aware and compare their behavior in the 
encounters with objective standards, which are socially desirable behaviors.28  
If encounter participants notice a discrepancy between their behavior and 
what is socially desirable, then they will alter their behavior.29  As will be 
discussed further below, these socially desirable behaviors include 
 
21  See generally Barak Ariel, Increasing Cooperation With the Police Using Body Worn 
Cameras, 19 POLICE Q. 331 (2016). 
22  T. SHELLEY DUVAL & ROBERT WICKLUND, A THEORY OF OBJECTIVE SELF-AWARENESS 
10 (1st ed. 1972). 
23  Id. at 4.  
24  Id. at 10.  
25  Id. at 42–51, 100, 101; Paul Silvia & T. Shelley Duval, Objective Self-Awareness 
Theory: Recent Progress and Enduring Problems, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 230, 
234–35 (2001). 
26  See, e.g., Kristen Munger & Shelby Harris, Effects of an Observer on Hand Washing in 
a Public Restroom, 69 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 733, 734 (1989); Delroy Paulhus, Two-
Component Models of Socially Desirable Responding, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 598, 
606 (1984). 
27  Tony Farrar et al., Self-Awareness to Being Watched and Socially Desirable Behavior: 
A Field Experiment on the Effect of Body-Worn Cameras and Police Use of Force 9 (2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/06/The-Effect-of-Body-Worn-Cameras-on-Police-Use-of-Force.pdf. 
28  Id. at 2–3. 
29  Id. at 3. 
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procedurally just treatment of citizens by police officers.30  In summary, there 
is solid theoretical support for the use of BWCs as a prevention mechanism 
to influence the behaviors of those who are under observation.31  BWCs are 
suggested to have both an intrinsic effect (self-awareness theory) and an 
extrinsic effect (deterrence theory) on those being watched such that police 
and citizens will exhibit socially desirable behavior in their interactions.32 
While it remains unclear whether deterrence, self-awareness, or both are 
generating the observed effects, several recently completed randomized 
controlled trials and quasi-experiments suggest that BWCs improve the 
civility of police-citizen civilian encounters by reducing complaints against 
officers and officer use of force (both excessive and non-excessive).  In the 
Rialto, California randomized experiment, officers wearing BWCs during 
treatment shifts generated a 90% reduction in complaints and a 50% 
reduction in use of force reports relative to officers not wearing cameras 
during comparison shifts.33  In Arizona, the Mesa Police Department’s quasi-
experimental evaluation of BWCs revealed a 40% reduction in citizen 
complaints against treatment officers for misconduct during the study period, 
and a 75% decline in use of force complaints.34  In the Orlando, Florida 
randomized experiment, BWC officers had a significantly lower prevalence 
of response-to-resistance incidents (involving electronic control devices, 
chemical agents, impact weapons, and other non-lethal implements) and 
lower prevalence of serious external complaints relative to control officers 
without BWCs.35  A quasi-experimental evaluation in Phoenix reported a 
62% reduction in complaints lodged against treatment officers relative to 
control officers.36  In the Mesa, Phoenix, and Rialto studies, many complaints 
were resolved quickly due to the accessibility of video evidence.37 
While there is some promising evidence that BWCs de-escalate 
confrontation and aggression in police-citizen encounters, not all evaluations 
support this position.  A randomized experimental design was used to 
evaluate the effects of BWCs on complaints against officers in the London 
 
30  Id. at 9. 
31  Id. at 2–3. 
32  Id. at 9–10; LUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 19; WHITE, supra note 4, at 20–23. 
33  Ariel et al., supra note 9, at 523–524. 
34  MESA POLICE DEP’T, ON-OFFICER BODY CAMERA SYSTEM: PROGRAM EVALUATION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 11 (2013). 
35  Jennings et al., supra note 9, at 485. 
36  Hedberg et al., supra note 9, at 644. 
37 KATZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 41; Ian Lovett, In California, a Champion for Police 
Cameras, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/us/in-california-
a-champion-for-police-cameras.html?mcubz=3. 
BRAGA_TABLE READS 5/31/18  1:31 PM 
518 BRAGA ET AL. [Vol. 108 
Metropolitan Police Service (United Kingdom).38  The study did not reveal 
any statistically significant differences in overall complaints made against 
officers with BWCs relative to officers not wearing BWCs.39  There were 
also no statistically significant differences in self-reported assaults on 
officers or injuries for BWC officers relative to control officers.40  A multi-
site randomized experiment involving 2,122 officers in eight police 
departments reported no overall reduction in officer use of force and an 
increase in assaults on officers wearing BWCs during treatment shifts relative 
to officers not wearing BWCs during control shifts.41  In a re-analysis of the 
multisite randomized experiment data, Professor Barak Ariel and his 
colleagues show that use of force by treatment officers decreased by 37% in 
three sites with high compliance to a BWC policy that required officers to 
notify citizens that they were being recorded at the beginning of the 
encounter.42  Ariel and his colleagues also reported a 71% increase in officer 
use of force in sites with low compliance to the BWC policy.43  Based on 
these findings, the authors hypothesized that unchecked BWC discretion may 
increase use of force as camera activation during situations with escalating 
aggression may further increase aggression during these volatile situations.44  
The authors also suggested that verbal notification of video recording by 
officers at the commencement of encounters may be helpful in deterring 
aggressive behavior and stimulating civil behavior before police-citizen 
interactions escalate in a negative direction.45 
B. INFLUENCE ON POLICE OFFICER WORK ACTIVITIES 
A very small number of studies have examined the effects of BWCs on 
police officer work activities, such as their willingness to be proactive, 
problem solve, and their discretion in making arrests and citations in 
discretionary incidents.46  Survey research suggests that police officers 
generally view the technology as facilitating the arrest and prosecution of 
criminal offenders by improving the quality of evidence via the creation of a 
 
38  GROSSMITH ET AL., supra note 10, at 29–33. 
39   Id. at 15. 
40  Id. at 25–26. 
41  Ariel et al., supra note 11, at 750. 
42  Barak Ariel et al., Increases in Police Use of Force in the Presence of Body-Worn 
Cameras are Driven by Officer Discretion: A Protocol-Based Subgroup Analysis of Ten 
Randomized Experiments, 12 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 453, 459 (2016). 
43  Id. 
44  Id. at 461. 
45  Id. 
46  See, e.g., LUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 19; WHITE, supra note 4, at 13. 
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permanent record of the events that transpired.47  In agencies considering the 
adoption of BWCs, police officers have been noted to express concern over 
how camera footage will be used to monitor officer performance.48  Indeed, 
officers may fear being reprimanded for not issuing a citation or making an 
arrest when a video clearly shows that a citizen has violated the law.49  Both 
orientations towards the placement of BWCs on officers—that is, the belief 
that offenders are more likely to be held accountable for their transgressions 
via the availability of video evidence and the a priori knowledge that 
supervisors may scrutinize officer discretion in resolving incidents—seem 
likely to influence officer work activities.50 
Two controlled studies suggest that officers do increase their law 
enforcement activities when outfitted with BWCs.  The Phoenix, Arizona 
quasi-experimental evaluation concluded that BWCs increased officer 
productivity when measured by the number of arrests.51  The evaluators 
reported that the number of arrests increased by about 17% among officers 
in the BWC treatment group compared to 9% among officers in the 
comparison group.52  In the Essex, United Kingdom randomized controlled 
trial, Owens and her colleagues found that incidents attended by BWC 
officers were more likely to result in criminal charges as compared to 
incidents attended by control officers.53 
Researchers Ready and Young used a quasi-experimental analysis of 
field contact reports to examine whether BWCs influenced Mesa, Arizona 
Police Department officer behavior during police-citizen encounters over a 
ten-month period.54  The analysis suggested that BWC officers were less 
likely to perform stop-and-frisks and make arrests, but were more likely to 
give citations and initiate encounters.55  Ready and Young suggested that 
 
47  MARTIN GOODALL, GUIDANCE FOR THE POLICE USE OF BODY-WORN VIDEO DEVICES 87 
(2007); ODS CONSULTING, BODY WORN VIDEO PROJECTS IN PAISLEY AND ABERDEEN, SELF-
EVALUATION 24–28 (2011). 
48  POLICE EXECUTIVE RES. F., IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 24–28 (2014). 
49  Ready & Young, supra note 12, at 454. 
50  BWC advocates suggest that the video evidence will facilitate the arrest and prosecution 
of offenders, as it offers a real-time, permanent record of the events that transpired.  See, e.g., 
WHITE, supra note 4, at 24.  In police departments considering the adoption of BWC, some 
officers expressed concerns that the cameras were a signal that their supervisors and managers 
did not trust them and that the technology would be used to track and scrutinize their every 
move while on duty.  See, e.g., POLICE EXECUTIVE RES. F., supra note 48, at 24–25. 
51  KATZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 31. 
52   Id. 
53  OWENS ET AL., supra note 12, at 14–15. 
54  Ready & Young, supra note 12, at 448–49. 
55  Id. at 454. 
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Mesa police officers were more proactive with the BWC technology without 
increasing their use of invasive strategies that may threaten the legitimacy of 
the organization.56  However, the authors did not assess how initiating 
additional encounters with citizens and issuing more citations might impact 
police relationships with the communities they serve.57 
II. RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
A. RESEARCH SETTING 
The LVMPD provides policing services to some 1.5 million residents of 
the Las Vegas metropolitan area.58  In fiscal year 2014–2015, the LVMPD 
had roughly 2,600 sworn police officers with nearly 1,400 officers assigned 
to the patrol division.59  At the time of the study, the patrol division was 
divided geographically into eight “area commands.”60  The area commands, 
each headed by a captain, have primary responsibility for preventive patrol, 
responding to calls for service, and other proactive activities.61  In 2014, the 
Las Vegas metropolitan area had a total index crime rate of 3,839.5 and a 
violent index crime rate (or crimes against persons rate) of 532.0 per 100,000 
residents.62  LVMPD officers responded to 1,139,777 emergency 911 citizen 
calls for service in 2014.63 
LVMPD began pilot testing body-worn cameras with a small group of 
officers in 2011, around the time that the agency was under intense public 
criticism and scrutiny for its use of force policies that ultimately resulted in 
a collaborative reform process with the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services.64  The pilot testing period served as 
an opportunity for the agency to experiment with different BWC vendors, see 
how officers responded to the technology, and draft the Department’s initial 
body-worn camera policy.65  By 2013, LVMPD selected Taser International 
 
56  Id. 
57  Id. at 454–55. 
58  The basic statistical information presented here was gleaned from the LVMPD 2014 
annual report.  LAS VEGAS METRO. POLICE DEP’T, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, 
https://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/Documents/2014AnnualReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).   
59  Id. at 13. 
60  Id. at 7, 11. 
61  Id. at 7. 
62  Id. at 9. 
63  Id. at 10.  
64  JAMES K. STEWART ET AL., COLLABORATIVE REFORM PROCESS: A REVIEW OF OFFICER-
INVOLVED SHOOTINGS IN THE LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT 6–8 (2012). 
65  Id.  The American Civil Liberties Union endorsed the LVMPD policy and suggested it 
was balanced in terms of transparency and privacy concerns.  See Colton Lochhead, ACLU 
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and its Axon Flex as the vendor and camera to be worn by officers, and an 
official body-worn camera policy was developed.66  A modest 
implementation of body-worn cameras on 200 officers was planned to test 
the impacts of the technology on a range of outcome measures and to guide 
a larger deployment of body-worn cameras on patrol officers.67  In 2014, 
docking stations that recharged body-worn camera batteries and uploaded 
acquired videos to cloud memory storage were installed in four area 
commands.68 
The LVMPD’s experience with body-worn cameras and willingness to 
implement and evaluate them set the stage for a rigorous program evaluation.  
With support from the U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of 
Justice, the LVMPD partnered with an external research team to develop and 
execute a randomized controlled trial.69  The research team, Sousa and 
colleagues, documented the implementation of the LVMPD body-worn 
camera experiment and, despite some operational challenges, concluded that 
the intervention was implemented with integrity as body-worn camera 
officers generally complied with the policy.70  However, one implementation 
challenge involved the recruitment of officers into the randomized controlled 
trial.  Due to the provisions of the police union contract in place at the time 
of the experiment, the LVMPD could not mandate its officers to wear the 
body cameras.71  As such, participants in the randomized controlled trials had 
to be volunteers who were willing to wear the cameras for at least one year.72  
The implications of this design challenge are explored further below. 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Randomized experimental designs allow researchers to assume that the 
only systematic difference between the control and treatment groups is the 
 
Praises Las Vegas Police Body Camera Policy, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (2015), 
https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/local-nevada/aclu-praises-las-vegas-police-body-
camera-policy/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).  The LVMPD BWC policy requires that “whenever 
possible, safe and practical, officers should inform individuals that they are being recorded.”  
LAS VEGAS METRO. POLICE DEP’T, 5/210.01 BODY WORN CAMERAS, available at 
http://ipicd.com/ceer/files/LVMPD%20BWC%20Policy.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
66  STEWART ET AL., supra note 64, at 6–8. 
67  Id. 
68  Id. 
69  William Sousa et al., Research on Body Worn Cameras: Meeting the Challenges of 
Police Operations, Program Implementation, and Randomized Controlled Trial Designs, 19 
POLICE Q. 364, 370 (2016). 
70  Id. 
71  Id.  
72  Id. 
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presence of the intervention; this permits a clear assessment of causes and 
effects.73  Randomized experiments are valued for their strong internal 
validity—that is, the extent to which a research design can eliminate 
competing explanations of an observed correlation.74  The randomization 
procedure allows the assumption to be made that there are no systematic 
differences between officers in the treatment and control groups prior to the 
experiment.  Since randomized experiments control for confounding factors 
by design, analyses of experimental data do not require extensive statistical 
modeling to ensure rival causal influences are identified and controlled.75 
This randomized controlled trial tested the impact of body-worn 
cameras on citizen complaint reports, police use of force incidents, and police 
activity measures for treatment officers as compared to control officers over 
pre-intervention and intervention time periods. Treatment officers were 
requested to wear the body cameras for at least a twelve-month intervention 
period.  N=416 volunteer patrol officers were identified and randomized to 
treatment and control groups beginning in February 2014 and continuing 
through September 2014.  This extended time period was needed to recruit 
eligible patrol officers through informational sessions held in each of the area 
commands, randomize volunteer officers from each area command into 
treatment and control groups, equip the treatment officers, and train them on 
BWC operations and policy.  In anticipation of higher levels of attrition in 
the treatment group, the randomization procedure was weighted so that 10% 
more officers would be allocated to wear body cameras.  The randomization 
process resulted in the assignment of N=218 officers to the treatment group 
and N=198 officers to the control group. 
The LVMPD provided the evaluation team with detailed information on 
the patrol officers who did participate (N=416) in the randomized controlled 
trial as well as the remaining patrol officers (N=955) who did not participate 
in the randomized controlled trial.  This information included age, race, sex, 
rank, time on the job, current assignment, and their unique identification 
number.  All officers in the randomized controlled trial were closely 
monitored over the course of the March 1, 2014–September 30, 2015 
intervention period.  The data on the officers not participating in the 
randomized controlled trial represented a “snapshot” of nonexperimental 
officers as of the start of the experiment on March 1, 2014. 
 
73  WILLIAM SHADISH ET AL., EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR 
GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE 13, 246–56 (2002). 
74  Id. at 54–55. 
75  David Weisburd, Justifying the Use of Non-Experimental Methods and Disqualifying 
the Use of Randomized Controlled Trials, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 209, 220–21 
(2010). 
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Official data on complaint reports and police officer use of force reports 
were acquired from the LVMPD Professional Standards Division between 
March 1, 2011 and September 30, 2015.  The evaluation team matched the 
unique officer identification numbers for randomized controlled trial 
participants and non-participants to officer identification numbers in the 
complaint and use of force report data.  Complaints were investigated by the 
Internal Affairs Bureau and originate externally from citizens who filed 
reports and internally from LVMPD personnel.  The complaint report data 
included the date and time of the alleged misconduct, the types of allegations 
made against the officers, the unique identification number of the officer(s) 
alleged to be involved in the misconduct, and disposition information. 
According to LVMPD policy, officers are not required to submit reports 
on low-level use of force incidents (such as empty hand tactics not involving 
strikes, use of baton as an escort tool, handcuffs, other restraints, and 
minimum lateral vascular neck restraint), unless the subject is injured or 
complains of injury.76  Police officers are required to submit reports on 
intermediate use of force incidents (such as use of electronic discharge 
devices, empty hand strikes, low-lethality shotguns, baton use with impact, 
and pepper spray) and deadly force incidents.77  Police officer use of force 
data included the date and time of the incident, the unique identification 
number of the officer(s) involved in the incident, and the types of force used 
in the incident.  It is important to note here that these data do not distinguish 
between excessive and non-excessive force applied by LVMPD officers. 
C. ASSESSING EXPERIMENTAL GROUP BALANCE AND 
GENERALIZABILITY 
Randomization provides a simple and convincing method for achieving 
comparability in the treatment and control groups.78  If randomization is done 
correctly, the only systematic difference between treatment and control 
groups should be the presence or absence of the treatment.79  To test the 
balance between the treatment and control groups on key officer variables, 
we used independent samples (t tests) and standardized mean differences, 
known as Cohen’s d.80  Table 1 presents basic descriptive information on 
officers participating in the experiment and the results of these tests; for 
binary variables, means are expressed as percentages.  A positive t test 
 
76  LVMPD Directive GO-021-12, Use of Force, effective June 22, 2012. 
77  Id. 
78  SHADISH ET AL., supra note 73, at 248.  
79  Id. 
80  JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 15–20 
(1988). 
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indicates that the treatment group has a higher mean than the control group.  
Covariate imbalance would be exhibited by Cohen’s |d| in excess of .20 and 
a |t| in excess of 1.96.  The equality of variances was tested and confirmed 
for all variables.  This reveals that the randomization created balanced 
treatment and control groups. 
Table 1. Summary Characteristics 








  Balance 
Diagnostics 
  Balance 
Diagnostics 
 
Officer Characteristics Mean (SD) t d Mean (SD) t d 
Experimental Group 52.4% -- -- 30.3% -- -- 
Male 91.6% .12 .006 90.6% .83 .023 
White 72.4% .72 .035 71.4% .51 .014 
Hispanic 13.2% -.53 .026 14.1% -.90 .024 
Black 8.9% -.82 .041 7.4% 1.40 .038 
Asian/Other 5.5% .41 .019 7.1% -1.47 .039 
Mean Age 36.77 (7.89) -1.40 .068 36.40 (7.68) 1.17 .031 
Mean Years on Job 9.15 (5.21) -1.56 .076 8.91 (5.65) 1.07 .028 
Patrol Officer II 76.4% 1.01 .049 79.7% -1.99* .054 
Patrol Officer I 8.7% -.30 .015 11.0% -1.84 .049 
Sergeant 14.9% -.96 .047 9.3% 4.79** .128 
Yearly Complaints 
2012-2014 
.837 (1.137) 1.51 .078 .891 (1.51) -1.21 .032 
Yearly Use of Force 
2012-2014 
.643 (.877) 1.03 .050 .657 (.881) -.91 .025 
Bolden 13.5% 1.05 .051 13.1% .24 .006 
Convention Center 7.2% .86 .042 11.7% -3.45** .093 
Downtown 9.6% -1.01 .049 11.3% -1.30 .035 
Enterprise 19.5% -.85 .042 14.6% 3.39** .091 
Northeast 19.7% -.49 .023 13.9% 4.16** .111 
Northwest 17.3% .85 .042 11.1% 4.99** .131 
South Central 7.5% 1.02 .050 11.1% -2.84** .076 
Southeast 5,7% .28 .014 13.1% -5.42** .145 
Note: Experimental Group in the Treatment v. Control Group columns designates officers in the treatment group.  
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Experimental Group in the Participant v. Non-Participant columns designates officers in the randomized controlled trial.  
Binary variable means are expressed as percentages. 
* = p < .05 
** = p < .01 
 
 We also tested whether there were any systematic differences between 
patrol officers who participated in the experiment (N=416) and patrol officers 
who did not participate in the experiment (N=955) using the same approach 
(Table 1).  There were no statistically significant differences in sex, race, age, 
years on the job, mean yearly complaints, and mean yearly use of force 
reports noted between the patrol officers who volunteered to participate in 
the randomized controlled trial and those who did not.  These data suggest 
that officers with higher numbers of complaints and use of force reports did 
not seem to avoid participating in the body-worn camera pilot program.  
Indeed, on most observable characteristics, the volunteer officers seemed no 
different than those officers who chose not to volunteer for the program. 
When compared to their non-volunteer counterparts, volunteer officers 
were somewhat more likely to be sergeants and to be assigned to the 
Enterprise, Northeast, and Northwest area commands and somewhat less 
likely to be patrol officers and to be assigned to the Convention Center, 
Southeast, and South Central area commands.81  These observed differences 
were largely driven by implementation decisions.  During the pre-
implementation recruitment period, LVMPD commanders highly 
encouraged sergeants to “lead by example” by volunteering for the body-
worn camera program.  These data suggest that many sergeants responded to 
this call.  The LVMPD located the body-worn camera docking stations in 
four area commands: Bolden, Enterprise, Northeast, and Northwest.  
Participating officers were required to place their cameras in the docking 
stations at the end of the shift so that acquired videos could be uploaded to 
cloud memory storage.  Patrol officers not assigned to an area command with 
a docking station could still participate through an alternative mechanism that 
LVMPD established for uploading videos.  However, the lack of docking 
station infrastructure at those area commands limited the number of officers 
who volunteered from them. 
The balanced treatment and control groups supports the internal validity 
of the design and suggests that the randomized controlled trial was well-
positioned to isolate the impact of body-worn cameras on the study outcome 
measures.  External validity, however, gauges the extent to which the 
 
81  While the t-tests revealed that the observed differences were statistically significant at 
the α=.05 level, the Cohen’s d standardized mean difference metric suggested that these 
differences were small (ES<.20).  See MARK W. LIPSEY, DESIGN SENSITIVITY: STATISTICAL 
POWER FOR EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 55 (1990). 
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findings of a study can be generalized to the population of interest.82  A study 
can have very high internal validity but be relevant only to a very limited 
number of contexts or problems.  Inferences about cause-effect relationships 
based on a specific scientific study are said to possess external validity if they 
may be generalized from the unique and idiosyncratic experimental settings, 
procedures, and participants to other populations and conditions.83  The 
available data presented here suggest that the findings of this study can be 
generalized to other LVMPD officers with the caveat that there are some 
small differences in rank and command area. 
D. OFFICER ATTRITION 
Attrition represents a threat to the internal validity of randomized 
experiments as it introduces bias into the analysis of experimental data.84  In 
general, attrition from the randomized controlled trial was low: only 10.1% 
(42 of 416) of the officers left their assignments during their twelve-month 
intervention periods.  However, differential attrition was noted for the 
treatment officers (N=26, 11.9% of 218) when compared to the control 
officers (N=16, 8.1% of 198).  In the treatment group, fourteen officers 
changed assignments from the patrol division and did not continue wearing 
body cameras, seven officers withdrew from the program but stayed in their 
current assignment, two officers retired, two officers resigned from the 
LVMPD, and one person took a medical leave for a surgical procedure.  In 
the control group, thirteen officers changed assignments from the patrol 
division, two officers resigned from the LVMPD, and one officer retired. 
To address the observed attrition issue, we used intention-to-treat (ITT) 
analyses based on the initial random assignment to treatment rather than 
analyses of the treatment as actually received.  ITT analyses provide fair 
comparisons between treatment and control groups because it avoids the bias 
associated with the non-random loss of study participants.85  As such, all 
N=218 treatment officers and N=198 control officers were included in our 
analyses. 
E. CONTAMINATION OF CONTROL CONDITIONS 
One possible threat to the internal validity of any randomized 
 
82  SHADISH ET AL., supra note 73, at 83.  
83  Id. 
84  Id. at 323.  
85  Sally Hollis & Fiona Campbell, What is Meant by Intention to Treat Analysis? Survey 
of Published Randomized Controlled Trials, 319 BRIT. MED. J. 670, 670–71 (1999). 
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experiment is the diffusion of the treatment into the control group.86  Put 
simply, contaminated control conditions undermine the counterfactual 
contrast between subjects that receive the treatment and subjects that do not 
receive the treatment.87  The stable unit treatment value assumption 
(SUTVA) assumes that the effect of some intervention on a given individual 
is not related to the treatment assignments of other people (or observational 
units).88  In the context of the LVMPD experiment, this could include effects 
of treatment officers responding to the same dispatched calls for service as 
control officers. 
The well-known Rialto, California BWC randomized experiment 
experienced possible diffusion of treatment effects, but this was due to the 
randomization of BWCs by shift rather than by individual officer.89  In the 
Rialto experiment, the same officers participated in treatment (BWC on 
during shift) and control conditions (no BWC during shift).90  As such, it was 
possible that participating officers carried over the treatment effect into 
control shifts.  While the evaluation did still find significant reductions in 
citizen complaints and use of force incidents during treatment shifts relative 
to control shifts, Ariel and colleagues also observed reductions in these 
outcome measures during the control shifts, which suggests possible 
contamination.91 
The LVMPD randomized controlled trial attempted to minimize these 
kinds of contamination effects by using different officers in control and 
treatment groups.  Because LVMPD normally operates with one-officer 
patrol units, interaction between officers—and thus the potential for 
contamination—is infrequent during a typical shift but does occur when one 
officer backs up another on particular calls.  Ideally, our randomized 
controlled trial would have also separated treatment and control officers into 
different policing areas to minimize interactions further.  Unfortunately, this 
was not possible due to our reliance on volunteer officers to comprise 
treatment and control groups.  Our research design was not able to prevent 
contamination of control conditions, and, as such, our estimates of BWC 
impacts on outcomes measures are biased towards the null hypothesis of “no 
difference” between treatment and control groups. 
 
86  THOMAS COOK & DONALD CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN AND 
ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS 54 (1979).  
87  Id.  
88  See generally Donald Rubin, Randomization Analysis of Experimental Data: The 
Fisher Randomization Test, 75 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 591 (1980). 
89  Ariel et al., supra note 9, at 527. 
90  Id. at 519–20. 
91  Id. at 527. 
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We were, however, able to utilize data from LVMPD’s computer-aided 
dispatch (CAD) system to monitor and assess the extent of possible 
contamination in the experiment.  The LVMPD also provided the evaluation 
team with CAD data recording citizen calls for service and officer-initiated 
calls made between March 1, 2011 and September 30, 2015.  In this study, 
the analyzed CAD data represented unique call events where duplicate citizen 
calls for service for the same event were removed.  For instance, in 2014, 
LVMPD officers were dispatched to 1,139,777 emergency 911 calls for 
service that represented 485,419 unique call events. 
The CAD data included the event date and time, call event type, and the 
officer(s) responding to the call event; these data also included basic 
disposition information that indicated whether the call event generated a 
crime incident report, whether responding officer(s) issued citation(s), and 
whether responding officer(s) made arrest(s).  The evaluation team matched 
the unique officer identification numbers for officers in the randomized 
controlled trial to officer identification numbers in the CAD data.  During the 
fifty-five-month observation period, the N=416 officers who participated in 
the randomized experiment made N=694,408 responses to dispatched call 
events and N=225,368 self-initiated call events.  Figure 1 presents the mean 
monthly counts of responses to dispatched call events for treatment and 
control officers between March 1, 2011 and September 30, 2015.  This figure 
suggests similar monthly dispatched call response activity levels for both 
groups of officers before and during the intervention period. 
These data allowed us to determine which officers responded to each 
call during the intervention period.  As such, we were able to estimate the 
percentage of calls for service that involved one or more treatment and 
control group officers.  Figure 2 reveals very modest contamination between 
treatment and control officers occurred each month (from March 2014 to 
September 2015); contamination ranged from a low of 15.3% in March 2014 
to a high of 20.9% in August 2014, with an average of 19.1% per month. 
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III. ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
A. OFFICER ACTIVITY OUTCOMES 
The CAD data were used to develop key officer activity measures for 
the treatment and control officers in the randomized controlled trial during 
twelve-month pre-intervention and twelve-month intervention periods.  Key 
officer activity measures included mean monthly responses to dispatched call 
events, mean monthly self-initiated call events, mean monthly call events that 
generated crime incident reports, mean monthly call events that resulted in 
citations, and mean monthly call events that resulted in arrests per month 
during the intervention and pre-intervention study periods.  The impact of 
BWCs on treatment officer activity (N=218) relative to control officer 
activity (N=198) was estimated through the difference-in-differences (DID) 
estimator.92  The DID estimates the difference in a treatment officer’s post-
intervention outcomes at time (t) compared with their pre-intervention 
outcomes, relative to the same difference for the control officers in the 
experiment.93  The equation for our ordinary least squares panel regression 
model was: 
 1 "#$ = &' + &)*+,-.# + &/01+2,3$ + &4*+,-.#×01+2,3$ + -# 
 
In this model, the monthly mean number of dispatched call events per 
officer was our exemplar outcome measure (Yit).  The regressor Groupi is a 
 
92  See, e.g., David Card & Alan Krueger, Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study 
of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 772, 778 
(1994) (using the DID estimator to compare employment in the fast food sector in New Jersey 
and in Pennsylvania, in February 1992 and in November 1992, after New Jersey’s minimum 
wage rose from $4.25 to $5.05 in April 1992).  
93  This randomized controlled trial had very modest statistical power to detect smaller 
program effects.  With only N=426 officers, this randomized controlled trial had an estimated 
statistical power of .531 to detect a small standardized effect size of .20 for a two-tailed test 
with α =.05.  The modest contamination of control conditions, described above, and the low 
prevalence of citizen complaints and officer use of force reports further undermined our ability 
to detect smaller program effects.  The standardized mean difference (Cohen’s d) between 
treatment (N = 218) and control groups (N = 198) during the intervention period revealed 
small effect sizes for the outcomes that were consisted with the results reported below.  For 
instance, the BWC favored a treatment effect on complaints for treatment officers relative to 
control officers (d = -.074, SE = .048, p =.128) and on use of force reports for treatment officers 
relative to control officers (d = -.089, SE = .041, p =.069).  However, the use of the DID 
estimator in a panel regression model with pre-intervention and intervention observations for 
each officer had the benefit of increasing the statistical power of the research design (416 
officers * 2 observations each = 832 total observations) to detect these small effect sizes.  See, 
e.g., LIPSEY, supra note 81, at 91. 
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dummy variable identifying whether an individual officer (i) was in the 
treatment group (1) or not (0).  The omitted group comprises control officers 
in the experiment.  The regressor Periodt is a dummy variable for whether 
monthly mean number of dispatched call events per officer was during the 
intervention period (1) or during the pre-intervention period (0).  The 
coefficient β3, conforming to the product of the group dummy with the period 
dummy, is the DID estimate of the effect of BWCs on the monthly count of 
officer-initiated call events.  The XTREG command in Stata 14.1 was used 
to provide ordinary least squares estimates of the difference-in-differences 
described above.  To ensure that the coefficient variances were robust to 
violations of the homoscedastic error assumption of linear regression models, 
robust standard errors clustered by officer were used. 
B. COMPLAINT AND USE OF FORCE OUTCOMES 
As noted in other BWC evaluations, citizen complaints against officers 
and use of force reports were rare events for LVMPD officers.94  Indeed, 
during the one-year period preceding inclusion in the randomized controlled 
trial, 45.4% of treatment officers (99 of 218) and 52.0% of control officers 
(103 of 198) did not experience a single citizen complaint, and 68.8% of 
treatment officers (150 of 218) and 73.7% of control officers (146 of 198) 
did not generate a single use of force report.  When these events occurred, a 
large majority of treatment officers and control officers generated only a 
single incident during the twelve months immediately preceding the 
experiment.95  Given these rare event distributions, we collapsed the observed 
counts into binary outcomes (0 = no event, 1 = one or more events) for both 
citizen complaint events and use of force events outcomes during twelve-
month pre-intervention and twelve-month intervention periods.  DID of 
proportions Z tests were then used to estimate whether treatment officers 
were less likely to experience complaints and generate use of force reports 
relative to control officers between the pre-intervention and intervention 
periods.96 
 
94  Ariel et al., supra note 9, at 509. 
95  For instance, for the sixty-eight treatment officers who experienced at least one use of 
force report during the pre-test time period: forty-eight had one incident (70.6%), fourteen had 
two incidents (20.6%), four had three incidents (5.9%), one had four incidents (1.5%) and one 
had five incidents (1.5%).  For the fifty-two control officers who experienced at least one use 
of force report during the pre-test time period: thirty-seven had one incident (71.2%), ten had 
two incidents (19.2%), two had three incidents (3.8%), two had four incidents (3.8%), and one 
had seven incidents (1.9%). 
96  HUBERT BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 235 (1979) (explaining the use of the difference-
in-differences of proportions Z tests to evaluate policy interventions). 
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IV. RESULTS 
A. OFFICER ACTIVITY OUTCOMES 
Table 2 presents the DID estimator results of the panel regression 
models comparing pre-intervention and post-intervention monthly work 
activity levels for treatment officers to monthly work activity levels for 
control officers.  It also presents the pre-intervention and intervention means 
and their percent differences for the various activity outcomes for the 
treatment and control officers.  Holding group and period constant, the BWC 
intervention was not associated with any statistically significant changes in 
the monthly mean number of responses to dispatched call events, officer-
initiated call events, and call events involving crime reports. However, 
controlling for group and period, the BWC intervention was associated with 
statistically significant increases in the monthly mean number of call events 
with citations issued and the monthly mean number of call events with arrests 
by the treatment officers relative to the control officers (p<.01 for both 
outcomes).  Comparing monthly officer means over pre-intervention and 
intervention periods, treatment officers generated 5.2% more arrests and 
6.8% more citations in their responses to call events relative to control 
officers.  While these seem like very modest effects on event outcomes, these 
increases represent a noteworthy practical impact on the total number of 
police-citizen encounters with punitive outcomes.  During the twelve-month 
treatment period, the officers with body-worn cameras generated an 
additional 471 call events involving crime incidents reports with arrests and 
an additional 1,125 call events with citations issued relative to their control 
officer counterparts. 







Crime Incidents Citations Arrests 
Impact (DID 
estimator) 
.021 (.025) .006 (.008) -.002 (.009) .685 (.036)** .352 (.019)** 
Treatment 
Officers 




29.85 9.44 11.00 10.27 6.87 
Intervention 
monthly mean 







+1.3% +1.3% +1.2% +7.9% +6.3% 
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Control 
Officers 




30.61 9.68 11.28 10.53 7.04 
Intervention 
Monthly Mean 
30.98 9.80 11.41 10.65 7.12 
Percent mean 
difference 




+0.1% +0.1% 0.0% +6.8% +5.2% 
N=832 
observations 
(416 officers * 
2 observations) 
     
 Note: Group and period covariates were included in the ordinary least squares panel regression models but not shown 
here.  Robust standard errors clustered by officer are in parentheses.  There were N=218 treatment officers and N=198 
control officers included in this analysis. 
* = p < .05 
** = p < .01 
B. CITIZEN COMPLAINTS AND USE OF FORCE OUTCOMES 
Between the pre-intervention and intervention periods, the percentage 
of treatment officers that generated at least one complaint decreased by 
16.5% from 54.6% to 38.1% (Table 3).  By comparison, between the pre-
intervention and intervention periods, the percentage of control officers that 
generated at least one complaint decreased by only 2.5% from 48.0% to 
45.5%.  The absolute differences in the share of officers with at least one 
complaint between the treatment and control groups over the pre-intervention 
and intervention periods represented a 14.0% reduction in favor of the 
treatment group (Z = 2.035, p < .05).  The proportional difference between 
the two groups over time represented a larger 30.2% reduction in the 
percentage of treatment officers relative to control officers who generated at 
least one citizen complaint. 
Similar significant reductions were noted in the likelihood that a 
treatment officer generated at least one use of force report during the 
intervention period.  Between the pre-intervention and intervention periods, 
the percentage of treatment officers that generated at least one use of force 
report decreased by 11.5% from 31.2% to 19.7% (Table 4).  By comparison, 
between the pre-intervention and intervention period, the percentage of 
control officers that generated at least one use of force report increased by 
1.0% from 26.3% to 27.3%.  The absolute differences in the share of officers 
with at least one use of force report between the treatment and control groups 
over the pre-intervention and intervention periods represented a 12.5% 
reduction in favor of the treatment group (Z = 2.057, p < .05).  The 
proportional difference between the two groups over time represented a 
larger 40.7% reduction in the percentage of treatment officers relative to 
control officers who generated at least one use of force report. 
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Table 3. Impact of Body-Worn Cameras on Citizen Complaint Reports 
and Officer Use of Force Incidents 
 Citizen Complaint 
Reports 
 Officer Use of 
Force Incidents 
 
 Treatment, N=218 Control, N=198 Treatment, N=218 Control, N=198 
Pre-Intervention 54.6% 48.0% 31.2% 26.3% 
Intervention 38.1% 45.5% 19.7% 27.3% 
% Absolute Change -16.5% -2.5% -11.5% +1.0% 
% Proportional 
Change 
-30.2% -5.2% -36.9% +3.8% 
Difference-in-
differences 
    
% Absolute Change -14.0%  -12.5%  
% Proportional 
Difference 
-25.0%  -40.7%  
Z-Test results 2.035*  2.057*  
* = p < .05 
** = p < .01 
 
These analyses also suggest that the modest contamination of control 
conditions noted by our analyses of call event responses did not result in 
diffusion of treatment effects or SUTVA violations in complaint and use of 
force incidents for control officers during the intervention period.  Indeed, 
between the pre-intervention and intervention periods, the percentage of 
control officers with at least one complaint decreased by only 2.5% and the 
percentage of control officers with at least one use of force incident increased 
by 1.0%.97  The presence of treatment officers with cameras at roughly one 
in five call events attended by control officers during the intervention period 
had no significant influences on how the control officers handled interactions 
with citizens. 
We also conducted an exploratory analysis of the disposition of 
complaints against police officers during the intervention time period.98  
 
97  The difference of proportions test result for the percentage of control officers with at 
least one complaint between the pre-intervention and intervention periods was Z = 0.4985, 
p = .6181.  The difference of proportions test result for the percentage of control officers with 
at least one use of force report between the pre-intervention and intervention periods was Z = -
0.2246, p = .8223. 
98  A formal DID analysis was not possible due to 18.9% (76) of the 404 allegations against 
eighty-three treatment officers with at least one complaint and 18.7% (74) of the 396 
allegations against eighty-nine control officers with at least one complaint incident not having 
dispositions at the time the data were provided to the evaluation team. 
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Complaints against officers can have multiple allegations of misconduct.99  
The eighty-three treatment officers with at least one complaint during the 
intervention time period had 328 allegations with formal dispositions 
completed while the eighty-nine control officers with at least one complaint 
during the intervention time period had 322 allegations with formal 
dispositions.  BWC officers were modestly less likely to have the allegations 
in the complaints against them sustained and dispositions were made more 
quickly than their control officer counterparts.  Some 14.9% of the 323 
allegations against treatment officers and 19.9% of the 322 allegations 
against control officers were sustained against the officers.  The 5.0% actual 
reduction difference (-25.1% proportional reduction difference) was 
statistically significant at a less restrictive p <.10 level (Z = -1.682).  Body 
cameras also resulted in a statistically significant -15.5 day reduction  
(t = -3.304, p <.01) in the mean number of days between an allegation being 
made and disposed for officers in the treatment group (mean = 49.3, standard 
deviation = 57.2) relative to officers in the control group (mean = 64.8, 
standard deviation = 62.3). 
CONCLUSION 
The results of our randomized controlled trial suggest that the placement 
of BWCs on LVMPD officers reduced complaints and use of force reports 
for treatment officers relative to non-BWC comparison officers.  These 
results support the position that BWCs may de-escalate aggression or have a 
civilizing effect on the nature of police-citizen encounters.  Research 
suggests that police disproportionately use force when attempting to control 
or apprehend suspects in disadvantaged, minority neighborhoods.100  
Minority citizens are also more likely to feel that they experience 
disrespectful treatment at the hands of officers.101  The complaint and use of 
force reductions associated with placing BWCs on police officers may be 
particularly important for improving police-community relations in 
impoverished, minority neighborhoods. 
The presence of BWCs in police-citizen encounters also seemed to 
result in quicker resolutions of complaint allegations against treatment 
officers relative to control officers.  The availability of video evidence on the 
 
99  One control officer with 126 allegations stemming from a single complaint incident was 
excluded from this analysis as an outlier.  
100  Robert J. Kane, The Social Ecology of Police Misconduct, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 867, 887 
(2002). 
101   RIOS, supra note 13, at 5; Rod Brunson, ‘Police don’t like black people’: African 
American Young Men’s Accumulated Police Experiences, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 71, 
85 (2007). 
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nature of the encounter seemed to allow internal affairs investigators to make 
quicker dispositions of complaints.  However, it is important to note here that 
the reductions in citizen complaints may not reflect a substantive change in 
police-citizen behavior during interactions.  The observed reductions could 
simply reflect a reduction in citizens filing frivolous complaints against BWC 
police officers.102  Indeed, the modest reduction in complaint allegations 
sustained against BWC officers relative to control officers suggests that there 
were fewer legitimate complaints lodged against officers wearing the 
cameras. 
Future research should attempt to interview citizens and police officers 
immediately following interactions to determine whether the BWCs do 
indeed have a calming effect.  It would also be important to unravel the 
theoretical mechanisms associated with any behavioral changes influenced 
by the introduction of cameras to police-citizen encounters.  From the 
standpoint of improving police-community relations, of course, the 
distinction between deterrence and self-awareness is irrelevant; that is, it only 
matters whether an intervention “works” by improving individual 
behavior.103  However, determining whether deterrence, self-awareness, or 
some combination of the mechanisms associated with both theoretical 
perspectives would be important in developing further refinements to BWC 
deployments and policy.104 
BWCs have been suggested to increase transparency in policing and, as 
a result, improve citizen views of police legitimacy.105  Behavioral changes 
for BWC officers in police-citizen encounters represent key components of 
Professor Tom Tyler’s process-based model of police legitimacy: public 
voice, neutrality in decision-making, trustworthiness, and treatment with 
dignity and respect.106  Citizens are suggested to respond to BWC officers’ 
 
102  See also KATZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 41; WHITE, supra note 4, at 20–21. 
103  See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Jens Ludwig, The Silence of the Lambdas: Deterring 
Incapacitation Research, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 287, 288 (2007).  Miles & 
Ludwig draw a similar substantive policy conclusion when assessing the relative impact of 
incarceration through on individual offending rates through incapacitation and deterrence 
crime control mechanisms. 
104  For instance, if encounter participants noted that they were deterred from aggressive 
behavior by an initial announcement that the interaction was being recorded, it might be 
important to make such announcements mandatory for all police-citizen encounters where a 
BWC is present.  Further, if non-BWC officers report that responding to calls where BWC 
officers were present stimulated procedurally-just behavior because they were made more 
aware of their own decision-making processes, BWCs could be strategically allocated to 
maximize these kinds of second-order impacts. 
105  STANLEY, supra note 2, at 2. 
106  Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME 
& JUST. 283, 284 (2003). 
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behavioral changes by viewing them as more legitimate and, in turn, become 
more willing to cooperate with the police.107  Placing BWCs on police 
officers may also influence other dimensions of police legitimacy, such as 
police accountability, distributive justice, and crime control effectiveness.  
As suggested by others, police legitimacy is substantially more complex than 
ensuring procedurally-just encounters with citizens.108 
The video recording of police-citizen encounters could enhance citizen 
perceptions of transparency and accountability in the day-to-day work of the 
officers that serve them.  Lawfulness certainly matters to citizens when they 
appraise the legitimacy of the police; putting BWCs on officers may increase 
their adherence to the rule of law when stopping, searching, frisking, and/or 
arresting citizens.109  BWC officers also might be less likely to allow extra-
legal factors, such as the race of suspected offenders, to influence their 
decision-making, thereby improving distributive justice.110  Finally, citizen 
perceptions of police effectiveness have been found to be related to 
assessments of police legitimacy.111  Placing BWCs on officers could 
generate a deterrent effect on crime by increasing offenders’ perceived risk 
of apprehension and punishment by capturing critical evidence on video that 
could be used against them in court proceedings.  Unfortunately, there is little 
evidence available on the varied impacts that BWCs could have on the 
different aspects of police legitimacy.112 
In this randomized controlled trial, we found that BWC officers 
generated more arrests and issued more citations than their control 
counterparts.  Further research is needed to determine whether these 
increases in enforcement activity were driven by enhanced officer confidence 
that the video evidence collected would be used to hold offenders 
accountable for their transgressions, officers’ concerns that supervisors who 
view videos of the interactions would hold them accountable for their 
discretionary actions, or both.  Further research would help determine 
whether increased arrest and citation activity affected communities of color 
 
107  Ariel, supra note 21, at 352–53. 
108  Anthony Bottoms & Justice Tankebe, Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic 
Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 119, 168–70 
(2012); Justice Tankebe, Public Cooperation with the Police in Ghana: Does Procedural 
Fairness Matter?, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 1265, 1265–67 (2012). 
109  Justice Tankebe, Viewing Things Differently: The Dimensions of Public Perceptions 
of Police Legitimacy, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 103, 108–09 (2013). 
110  Michael Reisig et al., The Construct Validity and Refinement of Process-Based 
Policing Measures, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1005, 1024 (2007). 
111  Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 108, at 146–47; Tankebe, supra note 108, at 1275–
83.  
112  LUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 19; WHITE, supra note 4, at 19–20. 
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or other concerned communities disproportionately.  It is also unknown how 
the observed increased enforcement activity of BWC officers might influence 
police legitimacy.  It is possible that increased enforcement activity 
associated with BWCs might enhance legitimacy by improving police 
effectiveness in controlling crime and their capacity to hold offenders 
accountable. 
Alternatively, increased enforcement activity could undermine police 
legitimacy if citizens view heightened arrests and citations as harmful to their 
communities.  Citizens’ appraisals of the police are influenced by the style of 
policing in their communities.113  Policing strategies that emphasize 
increased investigative stops, criminal summonses, and misdemeanor arrests 
across jurisdictions have been shown to generate concern regarding racial 
disparities114 and are suggested to contribute to the increased incarceration of 
young minority males.115  The findings of this randomized controlled trial 
raise the possibility that, in our most vulnerable neighborhoods, increased 
enforcement activity associated with the placement of BWCs on officers 
could possibly undermine improvement in citizen perceptions of the police 
generated by reductions in complaints and use of force incidents. 
Former President Obama’s Task Force on Twenty-First Century 
Policing recommended that police departments need to include “an 
evaluation or assessment process to gauge the effectiveness of any new 
technology, soliciting input from all levels of the agency, from line officer to 
leadership, as well as assessment from members of the community.”116  
Unfortunately, BWCs have been adopted by many urban police departments 
without much scientific evidence available to guide implementation.117  To 
some observers, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, BWCs are “a 
[w]in [f]or [a]ll when implemented with the right policies in place.”118  
However, without fuller understanding of the intended and unintended 
consequences of this new technology, it is difficult to know what the “right” 
policies are.  The findings of this study suggest that as this body of scientific 
evidence continues to develop, jurisdictions should implement BWCs with 
eternal vigilance to both intended and unintended consequences. 
 
113  See, e.g., RONALD WEITZER & STEVEN A. TUCH, RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA: 
CONFLICT AND REFORM 39–44 (2006). 
114  Jeffrey Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography 
and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in RACE, ETHNICITY AND 
POLICING 338–39 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds., 1st ed. 2010). 
115  EPP ET AL., supra note 13, at 139–145, 155–60. 
116  PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 35 (2015). 
117  LUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 3. 
118  STANLEY, supra note 2, at 1. 
